


【論壇】

## 「思想史國際轉向」與東亞或中國思想史研究——

對David Armitage教授〈思想史的國際轉向〉一文的回應\*



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首先必須聲明，我完全可以接受David Armitage教授關於「在這個世界主義的團體中，橫跨中國到秘魯，『觀念是不分膚色、年紀、種族、性別』」的說法，也完全能夠理解，在歷史學界普遍出現「國際的」(international)、「跨國的」(transnational)、「比較的」(comparative)以及「全球的」(global)研究轉向的時候，思想史家們希望與同行一道採取跨國甚至跨地區的思想史研究的心情。

不過，我們仍舊需要提出一些問題。第一，這種被稱為「思想史的國際轉向」的趨向，是否意味著過去的國別思想史研究就應當被淘汰？思想史研究的國際取向與國別取向，究竟是否一定是此消彼長，是否一定有「進步」或「保守」的差異？換句話說，就是它們是否可能形成互相刺激和共同提升的關係？第二，這種「思想史的國際轉向」的研究方法，是否更適應思想的交流、傳播更加方便和密集的近世，而相對不太適合於相對隔絕和閉塞的古代？雖然我也承認，即使無法說明思想的互相「影響」和彼此「交集」，「比較」方法仍然是普遍可用的，但是，對於古代思想那種超越時空的「比較」，除了說明「人同此心，心同此理」或「非我族類，其心必異」之外，還能說明什麼？第三，如果我們接受斯金納(Quentin Skinner)關於「語境中的思想」這個說法，<sup>1</sup>如果我們還承認政治環境是思想史研究不可回避的因素，那麼，傳統東亞／中國這種「國家」(或王朝)形塑「思想」(或文化)相當深刻的地區，是否還需要把思想史放在「國家」(或王

1 斯金納的這一說法，參看瑪利亞·露西亞·帕拉蕾絲—伯克編、彭剛譯，《新史學：自白與對話》(北京：北京大學出版社，2006)，頁271。

朝)的政治背景下來討論，而不必簡單地拋棄「國家」框架？我總覺得，倒是應當是把「國家取向」與「國際取向」結合，形成「跨國家的國別思想史研究」。

去年冬天，我在東京大學的會議上，曾經就全球史與國別史問題，有一個題為「全球史潮流中國別史還有意義嗎？」的發言，<sup>2</sup>現在——具體到思想史領域，我願意再一次提出我的看法。

毫無疑問，每位學者在討論方法論問題的時候，都會受到其本國立場和專業視野的影響，由於阿米蒂奇教授是治歐洲思想的學者，他關注的國際思想史現象，顯然較集中在歐洲，因此，那些在他看來互相流通於「國際」的觀念或思想，也常常來自歐洲，而且是大航海時代之後的歐洲。無論是他提到的「啓蒙」、「文明」、「自然」還是「包容」，或是他提到的思想家如18世紀中葉之後的狄德羅(Denis Diderot, 1713-1784)、杜爾哥(Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, 1727-1781)、史密斯(Adam Smith, 1723-1790)、康德(Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804)、赫德(Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803)、柏克(Edmund Burke, 1729-1797)和邊沁(Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832)。即使涉及亞洲，無論是這篇論文中提到的在亞洲廣泛被翻譯與流通的Henry Wheaton《國際法要素》(寫於1836年)，17、18世紀英國與荷蘭貿易公司的思想史，還是印度在19世紀早期的「自由派」對於專制主義的抗爭，這些看來關涉亞洲和歐洲甚至全球的思想史案例，其實都發生

2 葛兆光，《全球史潮流中國別史還有意義嗎》，《中國文化》，36(北京，2012)，頁26-30。

在「近代」。

這讓我想起鮑默(Franklin L. Baumer, 1913-1990)的 *Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950*,<sup>3</sup>對於歐洲,他可以用五個「永恆問題和中心觀念」,即上帝、自然、人、社會、歷史來貫穿並且討論西方近代思想史。問題是:儘管這些「永恆問題和中心觀念」確實是人類共同注重的大問題,但在傳統時代的東亞或者中國,這些「永恆問題和中心觀念」未必始終是在思想史研究的聚焦處。此外,即使東亞或中國思想家關注這些大問題和大觀念,其思考面向和角度,也與近代歐洲頗為不同。尤有甚者,一些在歐洲並不流行或不重要,但在東亞或中國卻極其重要的觀念,其實恰恰可能是那個時代東亞或中國思想史的焦點。

我曾經嘗試提出「中國的」思想史的關鍵問題和中心觀念,我想在這裡重複一下。如果也用「關鍵問題或中心觀念」來貫穿中國思想史(必須申明,這也許更接近「觀念史」而不同於「思想史」,在更強調歷史語境的思想史研究中,我並不贊同這種寫法),或許也有五組重要的觀念,是古代中國思想世界討論的焦點。第一是有關「世界/天下」的觀念,傳統中國有關「天下」、「中國」與「四夷」的思想,經過從「天下」到「萬國」的巨大變化,在近世成為有關「世界主義」與「民族主義」的資源,並引起從朝貢體系到條約秩序的轉換,也成為有關國際秩序重建和民族國家認同的思想基礎。第二是涉及「政治」的觀念,諸如「君權」與「相權」、「治統」與「道統」、「封建」與「郡縣」、「禮教」與「法治」等等,它涉及古代中國的政治與社會。在近世由於受到西方觀念和制度的影響,關於它的討論

才逐漸轉化成為現代的專制與民主、中央與地方、法律與教育等等政治思想。第三是有關「人」尤其是「人性」的觀念。比如什麼是善惡,這涉及心性、理氣、情欲的討論;對此儒家、道教和佛教有相當多的議論。這也涉及到古代中國對於「人」自身的看法。到了近世之後,經由西方概念的重組與命名,它逐漸被整合成為倫理思想,並延伸為現實社會對於「自由」與「人權」的解釋依據。第四是有關「生命」的觀念。所謂「生死輪迴」、「長生不死」等等話題,曾是古代中國人有關身體與生命的思考,也是儒家、道教與佛教彼此有微妙差異,又彼此通融的地方。可是,它在近代逐漸被來自西方的科學思想所摧毀和替代。不過,此一觀念在一般知識、思想和信仰世界仍有影響力。第五是以陰陽五行為基本框架的觀物方式,這當然可以看作是古代中國的「宇宙論」,不過,它卻以另外一種思路和想像,貫穿各種各樣的領域,不僅詮釋宇宙萬物,而且衍生出一整套觀念、知識和技術。不過,古代中國討論這些東西,並不是為建構抽象意義上的「哲學」,也不是推導出現代意義上的「科學」,而是為了「執一御萬」,從根本上指導政治、社會和生活,只是到了近代,由於受到西方科學世界觀的巨大衝擊,以陰陽五行為基礎的世界觀逐漸從宇宙認知、現象解釋、技術支援的諸多領域退出,僅僅保存在中國一般思想世界的感受和少數現代科學尚不能解釋的領域,尤其是關係命運、生存與健康的領域。<sup>4</sup>

這些中國思想史上的關鍵問題和中心觀念,與西方,甚至與同為東亞的日本、韓國的關鍵問題和中心觀念,可能並不一樣。在它們皆處在思想世界焦點的傳統時代,它們並未成為「國際的」而可能更是

3 鮑默著,李日章譯,《西方近代思想史》(臺北:聯經出版公司,1988)。

4 葛兆光,〈什麼才是「中國」的思想史〉,《文史哲》,2011:3(北京,2011),頁44-47。

「國家的」。

### 三

我總覺得，這裡還需要強調，思想史與觀念史之間也許應當有所區別。觀念史研究正如人們熟悉的Arthur O. Lovejoy(1873-1962)，可以把類似於「Being」這樣的中心觀念，當做大衛·阿米蒂奇教授說的「國家間貿易的商品」，這些觀念在穿越國境的自由「貿易」中構成懸空的「大鏈條」。但是，在討論思想史的時候，我更傾向於斯金納的說法，思想只是在「語境」中的思想。<sup>5</sup>因此，在東亞或者中國，特別在傳統時代，「國家」或「王朝」因素就不能忽略，這就像在全球化和自由貿易時代之前的中國，在國與國之間有市舶司，有重重稅收，有出口限制一樣，「思想」這個商品沒有那麼容易彼此共同擁有一個價格、一個規格、一個名稱。如果我們同意「政治語境」或「歷史時代」確實是思想史的解釋背景，那麼，就不得不注意到，差異性極大的各國歷史，以及這一歷史背景中所生出的問題與觀念，其實總是受制於「國家」。在傳統時代的東亞和中國，國家(王朝)太強烈地在形塑、影響和規定著「思想」，讓它們呈現出各自的「國家色彩」來。

也許，我總是特別強調這一點，即思想史上的東亞，特別是中國的「國家/王朝/皇權」因素。很多學者包括歐美學者都意識到，中國是一個特別的統一帝國和統一文化，無論你說它是從起源時代就「本質的」，還是歷史過程中逐漸「建構的」，人們都注意到這個現象，

<sup>5</sup> 斯金納著，吳瑞森等譯，《近代政治思想的基礎》(北京：商務印書館，2002)，頁6。

是「什麼使中國聚合一體？」有人認為是(1)政府的權力，包括秦漢以來已形成的官僚體制和中心帝國，(2)漢字書寫文化使人們共用一箇三民族文化，(3)逐漸普及和被承認的禮儀習俗。<sup>6</sup>無論如何，這個國家和文化的長期延續和自我疊加，使得這個國家的思想史上，有一些特殊的、很難「穿行與各個國家之間」的特殊思想，諸如西方思想史上激烈討論的「上帝」、「Being」，日本思想史上激烈討論的「萬世一系」、「神仏習合」，未必就是古代中國的思想史問題。而要理解和解釋這些「中國的」思想，恰恰需要對這個國家的歷史背景、政治語境和社會情緒等等，有深刻的認識。

我當然瞭解，古代中國的思想史上也充滿了「國際」因素，像中古時期來自異域的三夷教——祆教、摩尼教和景教，在那個時代曾經影響巨大而且啟動了中國傳統思想資源，使得中國思想史產生激盪和更新，也激起了中唐時代對它們的警惕和清洗；像近世來自歐洲的天主教，也曾經使得明清兩代知識人和思想家，不得不重新發掘傳統資源，以回應包括天文地理的新知識與涉及崇拜和倫理的新思想。現在越來越多的考古學、語言學和歷史學證據表明，古代中國並不是封閉在自我迴圈的思想世界中的，而是一個向四面八方開放的思想世界。<sup>7</sup>但是我仍然要說，國別思想史很重要，希望其他國家的思想史研究者

<sup>6</sup> 參看筆琛著，宋剛譯，〈儀式還是信仰：晚期帝制中國的統一文化建構〉，收入姚平編，《當代西方漢學研究集萃(宗教史卷)》(上海：上海古籍出版社，2012)，頁348。

<sup>7</sup> 美國學者韓森(Valerie Hansen)2000年出版的一本中古中國史著作，書名就叫「開放的帝國」，她認為，古代中國就是一個外向的，生機勃勃的帝國。見Valerie Hansen, *The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600* (New York and London: Norton & Company, 2000)。中譯本見：梁健、龔勁風譯，《開放的帝國：1600年前的中國歷史》(南京：江蘇人民出版社，2009)。

也理解，中國學者爲什麼要強調國別思想史研究的意義。因爲，對於國別思想史研究方法的堅持，未必是服膺方法論上的民族主義 (methodological nationalism)，也許反而是對國家權力過度控制和影響思想世界的警惕；提倡國際思想史研究，也不一定能夠破除狹隘的國家立場，或許只是對思想經由傳播成爲國際商品的作一般的事實陳述。

我特別想說的是，對於「國家」的巨大存在以及「國家」的政治壓力，並不那麼感受親切的思想史學者來說，或許探討超越國家的國際思想現象，是一個輕鬆的話題，但是，對於身處「國家」(古代的王朝與現代的政府)之中，始終感受到它無處不在陰影的思想史學者來說，說明這種思想語境的存在及影響，恐怕更加重要。

#### 四


再次回到「思想史的國際轉向」主題上來。

我需要再一次聲明，我完全贊成思想史研究中超越國家邊界的趨向。「思想本身是如何國際化的？」，這的確是個好問題。我也曾探討諸如佛教如何越嶺渡海成爲朝鮮和日本的宗教，並形成東亞精神文化的共同基礎，但我同時更關注的是，佛教思想在東亞三個國家內，如何因爲各自的國家意志、歷史傳統、社會習俗、知識階層的差異，呈現出各自不同的風貌，以至於各有各的命運。我也曾探討中國道教、日本神道教、高麗神仙道教之間的傳播關係，但我更注意到在三個國家內，由於「古層」的不同，對於道教的接受、轉化、變異也不同，這使得道教或者道教因素在三國文化中位置相當不同。因此，我希望，現在流行起來的超越國家的國際思想史研究，

可以與各國傳統的國別思想史研究互相促進，使得國別思想史擁有更廣闊的視野和背景。

[Forum]

The “International Turn in Intellectual  
History” and East Asian/Chinese  
intellectual history in East Asia/China—  
A response to Pro. David Armitage\*



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\* Translated by Jeng-Guo Chen

First of all, I heartily subscribe to Prof. David Armitage's statement that in a cosmopolitan community ideas are blind to skin color, age, nation and gender. I also appreciate that many intellectual historians call for transnational and trans-regional studies in intellectual history upon observing common practices of international, transnational, and global turns in general historical studies nowadays.

Nevertheless, it is important to raise some questions. First, do the studies of intellectual history conducted within national bounds have then to be abandoned? Does this "international turn" in intellectual history advance at the expense of national concerns or perspectives? Is the "international turn" progressive while the "national perspective" remains conservative? To put this in another way, can "international turn" and "national perspective" co-exist in a mutually beneficial way? Second, the international turn in the methodology of intellectual history can greatly benefit intellectual history of modern ages, in which the circulation, transmission, and communication of ideas are not only more accessible but also more frequent than before. Will this method be equally viable and effective for the ages in which societies were relatively isolated and self-content? I admit that even in research on an individually isolated society, the method of comparison can be also deployed, although such a comparative method may not inquire into issues of "influence" or "commonality" of ideas between the societies concerned. Nevertheless, I

remain doubtful of what results can be derived from comparing ~~ancient~~ intellectual systems across different time-and-space zones, except finding out that human nature is all the same, or else that all other (barbarous nations think differently because they are foreign. Third, in traditional China/Asia the "state" (*guojia*) or dynasty played a predominate role in the creation of ideas or culture. Accordingly, if we accept Quentin Skinner's argument that ideas must be viewed in contexts, and if we agree that a study of intellectual history will not be fruitful without contextualizing it in the political culture of the time concerned, can we forsake the idea and structure of the nation?<sup>1</sup> Perhaps we have to combine the methods of international and national intellectual history to form a synthesis of "national intellectual history in transnational perspectives."

I delivered a paper "Whether national history remains meaningful in the current trend of global history" addressing some problems of global and national histories in a conference at Tokyo University last winter.<sup>2</sup> I shall here reiterate some of its points with specific reference to the problem of intellectual history.

1 For the theory of Quentin Skinner, see Maria Lúcia Pallares-Burke (瑪麗亞·露西亞·帕拉蕾絲-伯克), Peng Gang (彭剛) trans., *Xinshixue: Zibai yu duihua* 《新史學：自白與對話——九位當代最著名新史學家的訪談錄》 (*The many faces of history: interviews with Asa Briggs, Peter Burke, Robert Darnton, Carlo Ginzburg, Jack Goody, Daniel Roche, Quentin Skinner, Keith Thomas and Natalie Zemon Davis*) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006), p. 271.

2 Ge Zhaoguang, "Quanguo chaoliu zhong guobei shi haiyou yiyi ma?" *Zhongguo wenhua*, 36 (Beijing, 2012), pp. 26-30.

## II

Historians' ideas of methodology in historical studies are generally structured by their respective national and professional backgrounds. Prof. Armitage is an Europeanist, and the international history of ideas he observes and studies is very much concentrated on Europe. The ideas circulating across nations were conceived in Europe, most of them after the age of exploration. The ideas of "enlightenment," "civilization," "nature," "tolerance" and many other concepts; or thinkers such as Diderot, Turgot, Smith, Kant, Herder, Burke, and Bentham, and others; various works about Asia or translated into Asian languages, such as Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (1836); or East India Companies of England and Holland; or the "liberal" rebels against despotism in nineteenth-century India—all these are phenomena of the modern age.

Franklin L. Baumer suggests five constant problems and principal ideas to characterize Europe in his *Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950*. They are God, nature, humans, society and history.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, even if these are universal ideas in human history, they were not focal concerns to Chinese or Asian thinkers of the past. Those Chinese and Asian thinkers who addressed the abovementioned ideas conceptualized them very differently from modern Europeans.

<sup>3</sup> Franklin L. Baumer, Li Rizhang (李日章) trans, *Xifang jindai sixiangshi* 《西方近代思想史》 (*Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950*) (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, 1988).

Similarly ideas that preoccupied major Chinese and Asian thinkers in the past appealed to few Europeans or were less elaborated in modern Europe.

Let me recapitulate briefly how I have discussed the critical issues and principal ideas of "Chinese" intellectual history. It seems to me that there are also five principal ideas in Chinese intellectual history (but I should note that I personally prefer studies of intellectual history than history of ideas, as the former is more conscious of historical context) from ancient times. The first is the idea of "universe" (*tianxia*, all-under-Heaven). The thinking of "*tianxia*," "middle kingdom" and "foreigners" (*si yi*, barbarous nations of the four directions) in traditional China underwent a drastic transformation from "*tianxia*" to "*wan'guo*" (a world of ten thousand countries) and became an intellectual source of modern cosmopolitanism and nationalism on the one hand, and the institutional transformation from the tribute system to the treaty system, on the other. Furthermore, it became the ideological foundation of international political order and national identity.

The second principal idea is political, related to ideas of "kingship vs. premiership," "supremacy of politics vs. supremacy of morality," "feudalism vs. centralized government," "governance by ritual vs. governance by laws" and other such dichotomies. This principal idea influenced the ancient politics and society of China. Only after western ideas and political institutions were introduced into China in the modern period did discussions of politics revolve around a set of modern binaries: despotism vs. democracy, centralized government vs. local government, and laws vs. education. The third set of principal ideas is about the ~~human~~



being or humanity. What are good and evil? The idea is involved in discussions of *xin-xing* (mind and nature), *li-qi* (principle and matter), and *qing-yu* (sentiment and desire), which were repeatedly debated among Confucians, Daoists, and Buddhists. Ancient Chinese thinkers used these ideas to describe humanity. In modern China, these ideas were reformulated and renamed, integrated into ethical thinking, and elaborated to constitute arguments for “liberty” and “human rights.” The fourth principal set of ideas is about life. Ancient Chinese used “reincarnation” or “immortality” in their thinking about body and life. In these principal ideas we can conceive nuances distinguishing Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. But at the same time, the ideas enabled each philosophy to accommodate and negotiate with one another. In modern times, these ideas have been dissolved and replaced by scientific thinking. The fifth principal set of ideas is a way of seeing the material world based on the theory of five phases. This was not only a cosmology of ancient China, but also a way of thinking or imagining that penetrated into many fields. It constituted an interpretation of all things possible and, more importantly, created a wide range set of ideas, knowledge, and technical skills. To be sure, the ancients talking about these things were interested in neither metaphysics nor science in the modern sense of the term. Their goal was to enable themselves to “grasp one to master all.” They hoped that they could thus lay a solid foundation for politics, society, and everyday life. This principal idea was greatly dissolved by western sciences. It receded from cosmology, interpretation of the worldly phenomena, and technology. It only barely retains its vigor in the fields that modern sciences are not yet able to

penetrate thoroughly, such as fate, existence, and health.<sup>4</sup>

These key problems and focal ideas are clearly different from the counter-problems and counter-ideas in the west. Perhaps they are also different from those in Japan and Korea. In ancient China, they took the leading place in the world of thought, but they were “national,” not “international.”

### III

We have to bear in mind that intellectual history will differ from the history of ideas. One can, like Arthur Lovejoy, consider the idea of Being as “commodities of the trade,” to use Prof. Armitage’s term. The idea of being, as a principal idea, is as hollow as a great chain in the free trade among nations. In studies of intellectual history, however, I take the side of Quentin Skinner, considering ideas or thoughts in their linguistic contexts.<sup>5</sup> In this viewpoint, the state or dynasty is an important constituent in the intellectual history of East Asia or China, and has to be taken seriously. Before globalization and free-trade landed in China, it regulated trade through Maritime Inspection Bureaus, heavy tariffs, and export restrictions. Metaphorically speaking, it was by no means easy to turn “thoughts” into

4 See Ge Zhaoguang (葛兆光), “Shema cai shi ‘Zhongguo’ de sixiangshi?” (什么是“中国”的思想史 (What is “Chinese” intellectual history?). *Wenshi zhe* (《文史哲》), 2011:3 (Beijing, 2011), pp. 44-47.

5 斯金納 (Quentin Skinner), Xi Rui Sen (奚瑞森) trans., *Jindai zhengzhi sixiang de jichu* 《近代政治思想的基础》 (*The foundations of modern political thought*). trans. Rui Sen Xi (奚瑞森), (Shanghai: Shangwu, 2002). p. 6.

commodities through the same scales of price, size, and name. If we agree that political context or historical background are preconditions of the study of intellectual history, then we have to admit that historical problems and ideas are always structured by individual countries due to great differences in national histories. In East Asia and China of the premodern age, the state and the dynasty disciplined and shaped people's thinking, and their thoughts accordingly took on their respective national flavor.

In my own historical writings, I like to emphasize the roles of the state, dynasty, and kingship in the intellectual history of East Asia in general and China in particular. Many modern scholars, including European and American scholars, agree that China was a unified empire and culture of a distinct type, regardless of debates about its nature and origins in terms of primordial essence or social construction. Thus the question becomes, how did China integrate into a unified entity? Various arguments have been made: 1) due to governmental power, especially a gigantic bureaucracy and centralized imperial rule, institutionalized as early as the establishment of Qin dynasty in the third century B.C.; 2) due to the writing system that enabled Chinese people to share one national culture; 3) due to widely adopted manners and customs.<sup>6</sup> Regardless of the reasons, the long continuity and self-reproduction of the Chinese state and culture created

6 See James L. Watson (華琛), "Yishi haishi xinyang? Wanqi dizhi Zhongguo de tongyi wenhua jiangou" Song Gang (宋剛) trans., 〈儀式還是信仰：晚期帝制中國的統一文化建構〉 (Rites or beliefs? The construction of a unified culture in late imperial China), in Yao Ping (姚平) ed., *Dangdai Xifang hanxue yanjiu jicui: Zongjiaoshi juan* 《當代西方漢學研究集萃(宗教史卷)》, (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2012), p. 348.

distinct ideas in the intellectual history of China, ideas which could not easily travel between nations. The heated debates in Europe over God or supreme being, Being, and the like, and the Japanese questions of the "line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal" and "unifying the gods and Buddha" were not concerns in Chinese intellectual history. To understand and interpret "Chinese" thought, we have to understand in depth, first of all, the historical background, political contexts, and social mentality of the nation concerned.

I am of course aware of the fact that the intellectual history in ancient China was full of "international" elements, such as Zoroastrianism, Monism, and Nestorianism. They made great impact on the ancient world and invigorated Chinese thought, regenerating Chinese intellectual history. The intellectual achievements of those international elements greatly alarmed Chinese literati of the mid-Tang dynasty and prompted them to purge these elements out of Confucianism. Similarly, Catholicism forced many intellectuals of the Ming and Ching dynasties to mine deeply traditional cultural resources to meet the challenges of astronomical and geographical knowledge introduced by the Jesuits, and to respond to new mode of thinking concerning worship and ethics. More and more archaeological, philological, and historical evidence attests that ancient China was an intellectual world by no means enclosed in a system of self-circulation and self-sustainment. It was, on the contrary, a world open to all corners of the world.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, I must emphasize that national

7 See the work published by the American scholar Valerie Hansen (韓森) in the year 2000 on the imperial period that is called *The Open Empire: the conquest*

intellectual history remains critically important. I hope that intellectual historians in other countries can understand why Chinese scholars so greatly emphasize the intellectual history of specific nations. Insistence on methods of national intellectual history does not necessarily lead to “methodological nationalism.” On contrary, it may serve as a warning against excessive state control over intellectual life, while at the same time international intellectual history does not necessarily help people break down the walls between countries—and may merely provide an accounts of how certain ideas became international commodities.

For intellectual historians who do not feel the overwhelming existence of the state, and who have no personal experiences of political oppression, international intellectual history may seem unproblematic. But for intellectual historians who live under the shadow of the state—whether ancient dynasties or modern governments—and those who feel it omnipresent, as it were, it is probably more important to study the intellectual development of the particular country in question.

#### IV

But let us return to the “international turn” of intellectual history. I

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ancient China to have been a vibrant empire that was oriented toward the outside world. Valerie Hanesw, *The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600* (New York: Norton & Company, 2000). The Chinese edition is Liang Kan (梁侃) and Zou Jinfeng (鄒勁風) trans., *Kaifang de diguo: 1600 nianqian de Zhongguo lishi* 《開放的帝國：1600年前的中國歷史》 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2009).

have no qualms in agreeing with the new tendency to cross national borders in the study of intellectual history. The question then emerges, how do thoughts or ideas become internationalized? I have studied how Buddhism traveled over mountains and seas to land in Japan and Korea and become the common foundation of the spiritual culture of East Asia. But at the same time, I continually attended to how the will of the state, tradition, manners, customs, and differences among intellectual elites brought out distinct features of Buddhism in the three nations of East Asia and gave it different directions. I did research on transmissions and relations between Chinese Daoism, Japanese Shintoism, and Korean Daoism. But I paid more attention to their national characters. I found that because of the ancient differences among these three nations, the reception, transmission, and transformations in each country were different as well. Accordingly, Daoism or Daoist elements played different roles in these three national cultures. To sum up, I hope that the current international intellectual history can go hand in hand with studies of national intellectual history, so that national intellectual history can expand its horizons.